Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose – feminism and 2014

It’s almost the end of the year and because I find myself about to move again, I’ve been thinking a bit about this past year and the many ways in which I have both confronted new challenges and ways of thinking and at the same time the ways in which many of the same debates and issues have kept coming back. The circular process of working through issues and questions is always so interesting to me, because of how new experiences and new knowledge can so easily be reworked into old ways of understanding things rather than open new spaces of thought. This has become especially clear to me on a personal level, where so many unconscious patterns, habits, and reactions continue to structure the way I approach people, places, and experiences. More often than not, it seems like our responses are so reflexive and automatic, and this makes it so difficult to change patterns that we know can be damaging or restrictive. Realising this in terms of my own personal life made me reflect on how this affects broader structures – we become so attached to how we perceive the world that it becomes difficult to change it in any drastic way. And above all, so much of this is unconscious. I am a big believer in the strength of the unconscious and really think that we are not conscious of so much of what we think and feel. This highlights not only why we often work through emotional issues unknowingly (which of course adds stress) but also highlights the importance of the media in impacting these unconscious ways of perceiving the world.

I think nothing highlights this contradiction between growing and yet coming back to the same place as much as my relationship with feminism. Feminism continues to be close to me not because I’m a woman and experience sexism daily, but because I still see it as one of the most politicised disciplines/movements available to anyone working within a postcolonial framework. Nevertheless, I have continued to come back to the “battle” between liberal feminism and postcolonial feminism, and the continuing impossibility of building bridges between the two. This came full circle at a panel I attended last week at a conference in Washington DC. The panel was comprised of some of the most well-known feminists working on the Middle East, and it seemed that the main issue was the following: By being so obsessed with countering Orientalism and countering Islamophobia, we have lost sight of what is happening on the ground in Middle Eastern countries and in fact have been so scared of criticising Islamists because we might be seen as being Orientalist that Islamists have gotten away with a lot simply because of that. While I have no doubt that this does happen – there is little doubt that many postcolonial feminists are careful about what they say and where they say it in order to not be co-opted by Western imperialist discourse – I think it sets up a binary that does a disservice to some of the amazing work being done by scholars and organizers working on/in the Middle East, who consistently view the issue in a nuanced manner. It seems strange to me to separate Orientalism from what is happening on the ground in Egypt, for example, since it is clear that global structures that are detrimental to the Global South have very clear and specific effects on Egyptians. So to talk about gender in Egypt without talking about neoliberalism, the continued effects of Orientalist cultural and media production, or the global gender regime that is heavily racialized, would be to talk about gender and Egypt in a vacuum. And so I suppose my point is this: we keep having to do the same things and argue the same points because those structures are still around. Feminists were writing against Orientalism in the 1950s and 1960s and feminists today continue to write about it because it is still there, even though it has changed in some ways. Indeed this is where the circular nature of things comes in – some of the very same debates that were happening back then, are happening again now. Not necessarily because they weren’t resolved, but because they could not be resolved without changes in the very structures and relations that were being debated.

Another shift that has happened in my feminist thinking has been re. intersectionality. I think there is little doubt that intersectionality has been one of the most formative theories to emerge in Black feminist studies, and has been central to my own development. But I think the time has come to ask some critical questions about where intersectionality has been taken these past few years, and what this means. I still stand by intersectionality as it was formulated in the early 1990s by Black feminists, and I think that what was articulated then was full of radical potential. However, looking at the academic work coming out on intersectionality now (and I emphasise that my critique is towards intersectionality in academia, not in movements/organising), it seems clear that something has gone wrong. When a liberal feminist can happily use intersectionality and therefore claim to be critical, something is off. It should come as no surprise that once intersectionality became part of the neoliberal academy it became simultaneously sanitised and de-radicalised. But the question remains: where to go next?

A final shift has been my introduction to more Marxist forms of feminism, and the potential they hold. I still remember sitting in my supervisor’s office in January this year and talking to him about intersectionality. He had an issue with it because he thought there was a problem with saying “intersectional feminist” as if that clarified anything ontologically. He went on to argue that Gramscian feminism and Marxist feminism generally held more promise, and at the time I wasn’t sure I agreed. Now I am starting to see his emphasis on materiality and why forms of feminism that do not take it seriously are bound to miss out on the essence of women’s oppression. The usual critique of Marxist feminist approaches is of course the claim that they do not theorise race, religion, or other social markers. This may have been the case back in the day but it certainly isn’t the case now. In fact some of the most complex theorisations of race and feminism I’ve seen this year came from feminists using Marxist frameworks. Understanding the dialectic between race and modes of production is made central and this makes it impossible to take seriously forms of feminism that ignore either race, neoliberalism, or the way the two co-constitute one another.

And so I guess that’s why I titled this post plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. Because it seems to be the same set of questions, the same issues, the same contradictions that I was thinking through last year. And yet so much has changed. New inspirations, new approaches, and a lot of new experiences. It seems increasingly clear to me that we will continue to deal with so many of these central issues simply because not much is changing structurally. And perhaps what has surprised me most of all is the universality of the gender “problem.” Of course sexism plays out differently in different times and spaces. And of course it is intertwined with other structures such as race and religion. And yet…the more places I live in, the more it strikes me that there is a global regime of gender oppression that functions differently and yet also so similarly. And it seems more and more difficult to think of dismantling it in any meaningful way. So maybe this is where Gramsci’s “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will comes in.

Where is Marxism now? Feminism, Racism, Crisis, Egypt and the Survival of Capitalism


A recurrent conversation I have had with friends during my time at Berkeley has revolved around the question of critical spaces. Thinking back now, I notice that I haven’t really had this conversation in other places I have lived or studied in and so it’s interesting that during this past year it has come up so often. The question is inevitably about why there are so few critical spaces within academia and how to grow without these kinds of spaces. Having done my MA and now my PhD at a place that is extremely critical and where postcolonial approaches in particular are the “common sense” rather than the “critical” I have always found myself telling friends at Berkeley (where despite its critical reputation does not offer a critical space on the whole) that these spaces exist. Having now spent the past week at the Historical Materialism conference hosted by SOAS in London, I am even more certain that these spaces are out there and that the solution for academics who do not feel them is to perhaps try to connect more to the ones that are already there.

The Historical Materialism conference covered a multitude of questions and issues being debated by contemporary Marxists. The topic of the conference was “How Capitalism Survives” and indeed this seems to be a pertinent question given the times. Every single panel I went to was interesting and loaded with thought-provoking analysis and further questions for debate. What was especially amazing was that there were so many shared assumption already there – for example, that imperialism exists and that liberalism is annoying ;) – and so this meant that a lot of exhausting, pointless debates could be avoided. I personally don’t see the point of debating things like whether imperialism exists or whether neoliberalism is bad for the working classes for the sake of having “diverse opinions” when the answers to those questions are blatantly clear. So it was definitely a relief to surpass those kinds of “debates” after a year at Berkeley where they not only happened way too often but also took up most of the time.

In this post I want to highlight some of the interesting debates that happened at some of the panels I went to. There were so many panels on race and sexism and that in itself is a useful refutation for those that automatically label all Marxism as necessarily reductionist, but is also a sign of the continuing tension between these different structures.

The first major theme across a few different panels was the (continuing) weakness of the Left inside Europe. (There weren’t a lot of discussions of the left in the US not only because it’s much weaker than in most parts of the world but also probably because of the dominance of Europeans at the conference.) This was discussed in the context of rising fascism (what is fascism, how is it related to production) and rising racism, including Islamophobia (in contrast to Bill Maher I do see Islamophobia as a form of racism). Two interesting points were: first, the fact that many of the far-right gains in Europe this year were because of votes coming from the petty bourgeois (or middle classes as some would say); in this sense it’s interesting to look at changing class dynamics, and not just racism, as part of the rise of the right, or more accurately, to see how these two structures are co-constitutive; and the second point revolved around questions of race and the working classes, and the ways in which it continues to prevent a “universal proletariat” from emerging.

The second theme was the ways in which a shift to service economies has impacted gender norms. One presenter – Emily Cousens – talked about the ways in which the successful performance of vulnerability has become a part of successfully performing femininity. She notes, following Butler, that gender is performative, and that the ideals of masculinity and femininity are constantly changing. What is new is that with the shift to a service economy in the Anglo-American world, vulnerability has become a much-required asset for many jobs. This reproduces a specific form of hegemonic femininity that automatically excludes women who are stereotyped to not fit this, including women of colour and working class women, who are assumed to be more “assertive.”

The third theme I found interesting was the discussion in one panel – that had focused on settler colonialism – about how anti-colonial resistance had not been a part of any of the presentations, and how this reproduces Eurocentrism even while critiquing European imperialism (indeed one comment was that one can be Eurocentric and against European imperialism, as has been argued by John Hobson). This is an issue that I have struggled with a lot – how to speak about imperialism, hegemony and capitalism, without being over-deterministic. By only focusing on those producing these hegemonic structures (in this case Europeans producing settler colonialism) and excluding the people who were resisting this settler colonialism, aren’t we still being Eurocentric by centering European actions and ideologies? Moreover, what about the ways in which this resistance constituted the colonial process and also the European colonists? Similarly, one can think of how an analysis of class struggles can’t just focus on the ruling class as though it is detached from the subaltern classes. The relationship is much more complex. And yet we need to conceptualise this complexity without losing sight of the fact that there is a power imbalance between the two.

Fourth, there was an especially interesting debate about Marxism and Eurocentrism. This happened in a panel about Marxism in the Arab world during the 1960s, where one speaker focused on how Lebanese Marxists in the Socialist Union had not seen Marxism as European and therefore as inapplicable to the Arab world. He asked: “What are the particularities of our period? Every Marxist work has to come back to this question. If something works everywhere then it is not valid anywhere. We don’t have to throw away the Eurocentric baby with the bathwater.” In my own opinion, the debate about Marxism’s Eurocentrism is obviously a complicated one, especially given Marx’s earlier writings as well as his work on the Asiatic Mode of Production and the assertion that all societies must first go through the capitalist stage. Yet much of this was later reframed, particularly in the Grundrisse, and so it is difficult to create a definitive or simple view of Marx’s opinion of non-Western societies. All of that said, I have found the work of Egyptian Marxists extremely central to my own research and indeed have found their work from the 50s-70s much more useful than most of what is being written about Egypt today. I found the book “Marx and the End of Orientalism” by Bryan Turner especially helpful, and am about to start reading Gilbert Achcar’s “Marxism, Orientalism, Cosmopolitanism” which I assume tackles similar questions.

Finally, there were two major debates happening at the gender panels (which were attended by equal numbers of men and women – seriously the first time in my life to see that!). One important debate was the problem with feminist movements that 1) focus on legal reforms and 2) that address their demands to the state. It should be clear by now the problems with the liberal tendency to see the solution to patriarchy as having better or stronger laws. Not only does this lead to an increase in criminalization (as pointed out by Jen Roesch at a talk) but it also assumes that the state is a neutral enforcer of laws that can somehow protect women. This view of the state is the main issue: the state’s priority lies (more often than not) with capital, not with those marginalized by capital. This focus on laws also detracts away from the broader conversation of patriarchy as a set of structures and relations that need to be dismantled. The focus on law therefore turns what should be a very broad conversation into an extremely narrow one. Now I know some will say – as has happened to me countless times – that legal reforms “are better than nothing.” What this misses is that once feminist energy goes towards legal reforms as the priority, it redirects away from other ways of challenging patriarchy, including class struggle.

The second important debate in gender panels revolved around intersectionality. Many were uncomfortable with what intersectionality is or what it has become. The growing trend of work using intersectionality that is apolitical and completely liberal raises important question about intersectionality, including the important question of what it is: theory? approach? metaphor? While intersectionality is useful in that it shows us the the ways in which structures intersect, does it explain why this happens? Perhaps it is here where Marxist approaches are more useful, because of their focus on explaining the materiality of oppression rather than just the fact that it exists and that it is intersectional. At the end of the day, if we want to change anything, knowing it exists is not enough – understanding why it exists becomes what is necessary.

I definitely feel recharged and inspired by this conference. The debates I saw were definitely the most complex and nuanced ones on topics such as sexism, racism, and – importantly – the Egyptian revolution. I can’t say how amazing it was to hear discussions about Egypt that were not liberal; that did not simplistically complain about how it’s worse now than ever before without trying to understand exactly what it is that is happening now; that don’t focus on freedom of the press and freedom of speech as if those are the only two important things being challenged; and that instead looked at the basis of what the revolution was trying to change: the political economy of a country being attacked by capitalism. Indeed Egypt becomes an important case study if the question is “How does capitalism survive?” because what we see is a restoration of an older system – not of the same system or same elites, but of the same logic of capital accumulation. Nevertheless, 2011 represented a challenge to capitalism, and because the organic crisis that led to the revolution has not been resolved, there will be more such challenges coming from Egypt, and many other parts of the world. Hopefully!

The personal is political – living feminist politics

One of the most difficult parts of my own feminist journey has centred around the inevitable and yet disturbing gap I see between what I believe in and the way I live. In other words, it is one thing to strongly believe in gender justice and feminist politics, and to advocate for both, and another thing to always live according to them. Whether in relationships, friendships, or even just everyday situations, more often than not I find myself acting or thinking in ways that go against what I believe feminism should be. And of course once I interrogate these situations, I understand why – and more often than it, it is because of the way we are socialised into our respective genders. But why is it so difficult to move past this when it comes to gender?

In an attack against Simone de Beauvoir, Pierre Bourdieu wrote the following:

There is not a better example of the symbolic violence that constitutes the traditional (patriarchal) relationship between the sexes than the fact that she will fail to apply her own analysis on relations between the sexes to her relationship with Jean-Paul Sartre.

Bourdieu not only said this, but also claimed that de Beauvoir had “no original ideas of her own” and simply copied everything Sartre said. In an excellent article on Beauvoir and Bourdieu, Michael Burawoy not only shows that these two claims are untrue, but also that Bourdieu is extremely sexist in the way he attacks de Beauvoir. What I found especially interesting in this article was something on de Beauvoir’s feminism and her own life:

Hers is a more contradictory position in which she dissects masculine domination, yet in her own life finds herself falling into the same traps that she denounces as inauthentic. While she is writing The Second Sex she is having a passionate affair with Nelson Algren that bears all the marks of her analysis of “women in love” – knowing it to be an inauthentic and ultimately futile response to masculine domination. More successful, though never without its tensions, is the “brotherhood” of Sartre! Throughout her life Beauvoir lives out, reflects on, and struggles with the contradictions between her theory and her practice.

De Beauvoir theorises that the reason for this contradiction between theory and practice is that unlike other marginalised groups, women cannot form a unified whole that can rise up against patriarchy. In other words, while other marginalised groups can exist in spaces separate from (to an extent) those who dominate them, this is not the case for women, who “orbit around individual men, complicit in their own subjugation, seeking the best possible partnership on the matrimonial market, subjugated in body and in soul to masculine domination.” As Burawoy writes,

Beauvoir sees masculine domination as a special type of domination that is stronger and deeper than class or racial domination, for the latter occupy spaces from which oppositional identities can be formed.

This struck me because it is something I have sometimes thought – women are so closely tied to individual men that it becomes difficult to think outside of those social relations. And yet, is it true that other marginalised groups do think outside of such relations? Maybe not, but to an extent they are able to exist in material spaces that create a distance between them and those that dominate them. Think of racial or class segregation, although I would question whether this physical separation constitutes a discursive break.

Women being tied to individual men conjures up a more materialist understand of gender, in the sense that this atomisation and individualisation tends to be more pronounced in advanced capitalist societies. Would this be the case everywhere? More importantly, what about societies that do not conceptualise gender relations in such an individualistic manner? And yet – are not all women orbiting around men, and complicit in our own subjugation?

I obviously am still thinking through these questions, but reading this piece yesterday reminded me of the same issue I have had for several years now – the contradiction between theory and practice in my own life, and why this continues. Is there something unique about masculine domination? Or is this a case of a white feminist – de Beauvoir – privileging gender above other marginalisations? And yet we know that “safe spaces” are important. What do these safe spaces look like for women – or do they even exist? De Beauvoir seems to be suggesting they do not because of the nature of heterosexual organisation of society, and therefore: “women orbit around men.” Does this make masculine domination unique or more difficult to eradicate?

The reproduction of racialized systems of social control

Over the past few days I’ve been reading two sets of texts and I couldn’t help but notice the striking similarity between them. The first text is Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow, and the second set of texts are articles on human rights and democracy as the new standards of measuring how civilized countries are.

In her book Alexander argues that the prison industrial complex is basically a transformed version of the Jim Crow system. Her main point is that following the civil rights movement and the collapse of Jim Crow, white supremacy had to find a new way to maintain racial inequality. This was done through two related processes: the War on Drugs and the expansion of the prison system. In other words, white supremacy persisted in a different form, and is perhaps even more dangerous because it is not overt anymore. No one is speaking about race the way they did during Jim Crow; but the systemic effects are the same.

An extraordinary percentage of black men in the United States are legally barred from voting today, just as they have been throughout American history. They are also subject to legalized discrimination in employment, housing, education, public benefits, and jury service, just as their parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents once were (1).

Around the same time, I began reading articles on the shift in global politics in the 40s and 50s where a “new international society” was created. This meant that what constituted civilized or barbaric countries was no longer explicitly stated along racial or cultural lines, but instead was made dependent on new markers, such as human rights and democracy. So just at the moment when it seemed like the international system was opening up and that any country could be an equal member, and just when decolonization was happening and states were no longer using the language of civilized vs. barbaric, an entire new system of subjugation was being introduced. This new system still ranked countries and still reproduced a civilizational hierarchy, but instead relied on different standards: human rights, liberalism, democracy, gender equality. So just as Michelle Alexander points out in the US post-Jim Crow, a new way of speaking about civilization was emerging, but the systemic effects are exactly the same.

As Buzan (2014, 588) notes:

Because the doctrine of human rights sets benchmarks against which all can be assessed, it naturally generates a performance hierarchy among states. That tendency is endlessly reproduced as the standards of human rights themselves evolve. So as the human rights issue becomes more influential within international society, it probably cannot avoid resurrecting something like the ‘standard of civilisation’.

Development and aid are naturally part of this new system. “The colonial obligation of the metropolitan powers to bring the natives up to a European ‘standard of civilisation’ morphed into an obligation on the part of the rich world to assist in the development of the ‘third world’ or ‘less developed countries’.”

The key point in both set of texts is that nobody is talking about race anymore (except those who oppose these new systems). As Michelle Alexander says, “In the era of colorblindness, it is no longer socially permissible to use race, explicitly, as a justification for discrimination, exclusion, and social contempt. So we don’t. Rather than rely on race, we use our criminal justice system to label people of color “criminals” and then engage in all the practices we supposedly left behind” (1). This can be extended to the ways in which the development industry or human rights discourse do not explicitly speak of race, and yet the norms they employ clearly refer to a civilizational hierarchy which, following John Hobson, is clearly a racialized one. Another similarity between these two cases is the formative place of anti-blackness within both systems. In the US, it is anti-blackness that underlies slavery, Jim Crow, and now the prison industrial complex, just as globally, the racist system underpinning notions of development, democracy and human rights is intricately tied to anti-blackness as well as other forms of racism such as Orientalism.

What this shows is why we should be apprehensive when certain trends, concepts of systems are presented as “over” or “dead.” As an ideology that has structured the world for centuries, it is unlikely that white supremacy or Eurocentrism will disappear without attempting to morph or transform itself. As Alexander shows, in the US it has successfully continued the same system in place during slavery and Jim Crow, except it has relies on implicit and covert racialized language and narratives. For example, the idea that a Black man can be president of the US is used as a rhetorical tool that deflects attention away from the fact that most Black men can’t become president of the US. And, as Alexander says, white supremacy doesn’t mean that there can’t be exceptions to the rule. Similarly, the new international regime of neoliberal capitalism relies on new markers of civilization that relegate countries of the Global South to the category “underdeveloped.” And it would be a mistake to not see this as related to white supremacy and race.

All of this is not to say that we should not be nuanced in the way we speak about white supremacy, and it is also not to say that other groups do not have agency or power. But often when we are called on to be “nuanced” it is a call to stop complaining about hegemonic systems and instead accept that we are somehow all equally responsible for what is happening. We can be nuanced about white supremacy in terms of pointing out its variations, the ways in which it differs according to context, and the ways in which it can be fought. But this nuance should not include accepting that white supremacy is no longer hegemonic, or accepting that groups oppressed by white supremacy hold some kind of responsibility for what has happened to them. While it is true that there is agency everywhere, this agency is not equal, because people are not equal, and it would be naive to pretend otherwise.

 As Alexander writes, “We have not ended racial caste in America; we have merely redesigned it.” However as long as the narrative continues to be one of separation and elimination – i.e. racism as something that is in the past and no longer exists – as opposed to continuity and reproduction, it will become increasingly difficult to fight against white supremacy in all of its formations. Moreover, as long as we continue to speak of racism as something some people do (often accidentally), we continue to mask the systemic and institutionalized nature of racism. White supremacy is a system of racialized social control that continues to structure the globe today just as it has for the past few centuries.

Resurrection of Lumumba

“The assassination of Lumumba was an act of colonial reconquest.

The Congo’s mineral wealth, copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, uranium, oil, gave the orders from the depths of the earth.

The sentence was carried out with the complicity of the United Nations. Lumumba had good reason to mistrust the officers of troops that claimed to be international, and he denounced ‘the racism and paternalism of people whose only vision of Africa is lion hunting, slave markets,and colonial conquest. Naturally they would understand the Belgians. They have the same history, the same lust for our wealth.’

Mobuto, the free world hero who trapped Lumumba and had him crushed, held power for more than thirty years. The international financial recognised his merits and showered him with generosity. By the time he died, his personal fortune was nearly equal to the foreign debt of the country to which he had devoted his energies.

But Lumumba had announced:

‘History will one day have its say. It will not be the history taught in the United Nations, Washington, Paris, or Brussels. Africa will write its own history.’

The tree where Lumumba was executed still stands in the woods of Mwadingusha. Riddled with bullets. Like him.”

- Eduardo Galeano, ‘Mirrors’

On Patrice Lumumba

“In the middle of 1960, the Congo, until then a Belgian colony, celebrated its independence.

Speech followed speech, and the audience was melting from heat and boredom. Belgium, a strict teacher, warned of the dangers of freedom. The Congo, grateful pupil, promised to behave.

Then Patrice Lumumba’s speech exploded and ruined the party. He spoke out against the ‘empire of silence,’ and through him the silenced found a voice. He paid homage to the fathers of independence, the murdered, the imprisoned, the tortured, and the exiled, who throughout so any years had fought to ‘bring an end to the humiliating slavery imposed on us by force.’

His words, received in icy silence by the Europeans present, were interrupted eight times by ovations from the Africans in the audience.

That speech sealed his fate.

Lumumba, recently released from prison, had won the first free elections in Congo’s history, and headed up its first government. But the Belgian press called him a ‘delirious and illiterate thief.’ In Belgian intelligence cables, Lumumba was dubbed Satan. The director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, sent instructions to his agents:

“The removal of Lumumba must be an urgent objective.”

Dwight Eisenhower, president of the United States, told British Foreign Secretary Lord Alec Douglas-Home:

“I wish Lumumba would fall into a river full of crocodiles.”

Lord Douglas-Home took a week to reply:

“Now is the time to get rid of Lumumba.”

At the beginning of 1961, a firing squad of 8 soldiers and 9 policemen commanded by Belgian officers shot him along with his two closest collaborators.

Fearing a popular uprising, the Belgian government and its Congolese tools, Mobuto Sese Seko and Moise Tshombe, covered up the crime.

Two weeks later, the new president of the United States, John Kennedy, announced:

“We will not allow Lumumba to return to the government.”

And Lumumba, who by then had already been killed and dissolved in a barrel of sulphuric acid, did not return to the government.”

- Eduardo Galeano, ‘Mirrors’

‘Favela reality tours’ in Brazil

“In the 1990s and 2000s, favela tours took on a mission of education and community service that aimed at demonstrating the ‘reality’ of the favela and countering the prejudice of the media. Enterprises such as Jeep Tours and Favela Reality Tours emphasized and idealized the safety and diversity within favelas. The guides insisted that favelas were the safest place in the city. The typical favela tour worked to erase the boundaries between the elite visitor and the shantytown resident by insisting on the sameness of lifestyle. Favelados were hardworking, television watching, morally up-right citizens who aspired to be and often achieved the dream of middle-class status. But this sameness was performed in a realm that was externalized from the normal city by the militarization of the regime, the sexualization of trafficker masculinities, and the racialization of favelas as a whole.

Tours tend to portray the favela community as untainted by the paramilitary organizations that occupy them. Of course, paradoxically, it is precisely the violence of the police-narcotraffic war and its impact on racialized public paces that drew the tourists. Moreover, the vehicles that tourists took into the favelas theatricalized the dynamics of militarization and racialization. Foreign or elite Brazilian guests on favela tours were confined to large military jeeps, a spectacle resembling the entry of military vehicles into a bombed city at the end of World War Two. Favela tours insisted that the borders and differences between the favelados and the ‘normal’ population could and must be overcome, but the drama of the tour itself restaged and spotlighted the fear and exhalation of crossing a taboo frontier and entering an outlaw zone, all the while highlighting the dangerous nativeness of the local vs. the detached immunity of the international observer.”

- Paul Amar

‘The Security Archipelago

The feminist bubble


This post is inspired by a Facebook post I saw the other day that was posted by Black Girl Dangerous:

How would conversations between oppressed peoples with common interests be different if we didn’t spend so much time worrying about how privileged people who were listening in were gonna interpret/appropriate/use for their own agenda what we say to *each other*? We put so much energy into worrying about what they think that we miss opportunities to do the healing work we need for ourselves in our communities. Which, of course, is one very efficient way oppression operates.

This is something I’ve been thinking about a lot lately, and something I am guilty of. It feels like a lot of feminist conversations these days revolve around critiquing white feminism rather than trying to create solidarity or a strong transnational feminist movement (white feminism here of course refers to the movement itself, not being “white” – many brown and black people, for example, adopt a white feminist approach). This is something I do too and have started to find problematic, not because it isn’t necessary but because it seems to create a momentum in and of itself that prevents non-white feminisms from moving forward. So in that sense I definitely relate to the quote above: worrying about how white women are going to interpret something we do or say is not only energy-consuming, it is ultimately pointless because no matter how many disclaimers you might add to something you write, many are simply going to see what they want and interpret it through their own theoretical lens and experiences.

I used to spend ages worrying about writing about gender in the Egyptian context precisely for this reason, because I knew that even admitting that gender oppression exists was enough to legitimate imperialist views and policies. To this day many feminists in the Middle East will not discuss issues such as female circumcision in specific spaces because they know it won’t be understood outside of the Arab-men-are-especially-barbaric narrative that has come to dominate. This makes it difficult to have transnational conversations because hegemonic understandings of feminism (white feminism, basically) continue to dominate. So in this sense, I understand why so many feminists focus on deconstructing white feminism, something I often do myself. I also think it’s important to continue to critique white feminism, but my question is whether it is useful to move away from focusing on that and instead focus more on constructing other solidarities.

But my frustration stems from the feeling that we are now at a point where white feminism has been critiqued and deconstructed, but that these critiques have not extended outside of the small bubble of postcolonial/critical/brown/black feminists. And I think this is why many of us continue to make these critiques. Even though they have been made a million times within this bubble, they still haven’t managed to become dominant and displace white feminism. But it seems to me that continuing to make them won’t change that: they will continue to fall on deaf ears. The reality is that white/liberal feminism continues to dominate, and in fact has transformed itself into an approach that appears to look critical but in fact is based on the same assumptions as first and second wave feminism. (I just want to add that I do understand the value of continually making these critiques in an emotional sense – the post is focused more on how to spread these critiques further.)

This morning I saw a Twitter exchange between two of my favourite feminists – Flavia Dzodan and Sara Ahmed, about white feminists and the often-racist articles they write. Sara Ahmed tweeted: “Yes when I read something like this I wish for it to be shocking but the familiar is exhausting, it gets hard to be shocked!” And this is exactly how I feel these days. I think she was referring to white feminism as the ‘familiar’ and I would add to that my own exhaustion of the familiarity of critiquing white feminism as well. It just seems too familiar.

This dynamic explains why whenever I start writing a piece on feminism by critiquing white feminism, I immediately feel like it’s already all been said and done. And it has – but only within the bubble. And here I use the term bubble instead of circle precisely because ‘bubble’ implies that it is somewhat removed from other groups and people (not to mention the fact that academia in general constitutes one big bubble). The question of how to move outside of the postcolonial feminist bubble (an even smaller bubble within the bubble of feminism) is a complicated one that I still haven’t managed to think through myself. Structural constraints are an important factor, including the continued dominance of positivist and liberal approaches in general, within which white feminism fits nicely. There is also the important point of internalized white/liberal ideas, which leads to many non-white scholars and activists reproducing problematic narratives that in the end aid in perpetuating a system that oppresses them.

A friend of mine suggested that the unwillingness on the part of postcolonial feminists to reach out and engage is part of the problem. I don’t really agree that this is the fault of postcolonial feminists. I think a large part of this is because of the structural constraints I mentioned before as well as the fact that many white feminists don’t want to engage as it would imply an admission of error on their part. Postcolonial feminism isn’t merely critiquing aspects of white feminism, but rather the entire ontology and epistemology underlying white feminism. In other words, there is no common ground, or little common ground, between white feminism and other forms of feminism that are critical or postcolonial. After having a conversation with @ebnee_e I also want to highlight that critique is a form of engagement, thus further proving that the lack of engagement isn’t really coming from the postcolonial feminist side.

On the other hand, I see my friend’s point in the sense that feminists often focus on feminism as a discipline that does not transcend itself. My own view is that gender relations are a part of all social relations and structures, and therefore gender studies should not exist as an isolated field in and of itself. Instead it may be more useful to focus on disciplines and try and understand how gender relations are part of social structures. A good example of this is how feminists working within International Relations have managed to critique the existing masculinist bias of most research and insist that gender relations become part of the agenda. In this sense, these feminists have forced other IR scholars to engage with them and address their critiques, and even though many IR scholars have resisted these new ideas, some have embraced them. In the end, it is clear that there is a feminist trend in IR, as small as it may be. I lean towards thinking of this as more useful than having feminism as an isolated discipline.

What is interesting, however, is that it seems as though postcolonial feminists have focused on working within a discipline that is not feminism – postcolonialism – and yet have still not managed to transcend the bubble. Postcolonial feminists have worked on politics, economics, psychology, sociology, and many other issues from not only a feminist perspective but a postcolonial one. This is why postcolonial feminists are such a major part of postcolonialism in general. And yet this has not managed to challenge the dominance of white feminism, even if it has made inroads in challenging the positivism and Eurocentrism of disciplines such as IR, sociology, economics, and so on. After thinking about it, it seems to me that critical feminists have managed to challenge specific disciplines by engaging with them because they have support from other critical voices within the discipline. So in IR, for example, it wasn’t only Cynthia Cockburn, Cynthia Enloe or Christine Sylvester making the critique that IR is Eurocentric, liberal and masculinist – other (male) scholars did so as well, and perhaps this is why it was somewhat successful.

So the question remains – how to create a challenge that is strong enough to displace white feminism? The problem does not seem to be theoretical or based on content – postcolonial feminism(s) certainly have done enough work in terms of deconstructing and problematizing white feminism. The problem lies more with reaching out. But this brings me back full circle: is it about reaching out, or is it about having someone willing to listen on the other side? I continue to believe that is is more about structural constraints (funding, the dominance of positivism, Eurocentrism) that prevent postcolonial voices from being heard (and this is not only a problem for feminists). I also think that isolating ourselves within a discipline and constituting feminism as a discipline in and of itself has done some harm, in the sense that other disciplines have managed to ignore gender relations. It seems as though only by forcefully engaging other scholars in multiple disciplines can feminists ‘bring gender in.’ 

The question of displacing white feminism, however, remains unanswered. It is not only about the unwillingness on the part of white feminists to listen and engage, but also about the fact that the current imperial neoliberal system continues to create situations of exploitation from which white (and well-off) women benefit. This is why the politics of privilege is so important and has to constitute the starting point of any transnational solidarity. But this is where we always get stuck. We end up with things like lean in feminism or campaigns by feminists for ‘Hillary 2016′ without any kind of self-reflexivity or acknowledgement that these strands of feminism actively oppress other women (and men). Moreover the continued exclusion of trans* and disabled women from white feminism further consolidates it as an exclusionary movement. The reality is that it is not about white feminists themselves (and these feminists don’t have to be white to adopt white feminism) or about what they say or do. It is about the underlying ontological assumptions they have and epistemological choices they make. A focus on liberalism is a key example of this. Because the critiques by postcolonial and critical feminists are so deep (in that they challenge the assumptions themselves), it is perhaps understandable why white feminism has been unwilling to engage.

Engagement in and of itself also doesn’t mean transformation. As is clear from the IR example, although feminists have engaged, and (some) IR scholars have engaged back, the discipline continues to reproduce its masculinist bias. While there are critical strands, there is by no means a critical consensus, as is the case across disciplines – again, I would argue, because of structural constraints. In this sense, feminism is not alone, although it is more extreme. Speaking to another friend, he asked me why the question of engaging white feminism was important to begin with. He suggested that it was impossible since there are no common grounds on which to engage them. This sits more comfortably with me. Rather than focus on feminism, then, it may be more useful to focus on postcolonialism, since postcolonialism challenges global structures and thus any critique of these structures will include a critique of white feminism.  This will also allow feminism to transcend disciplinary boundaries and create transnational solidarities not simply among other feminists but among all groups. This approach would also mean an acknowledgement of the fact that gender is not an isolated structure but rather is produced and reproduced by and through other structures, including capitalism, racism, etc.

Perhaps, then, the question of engaging white feminists is what is problematic. Isn’t it better to construct solidarities with people who share the same ontological assumptions? In this sense, it is not about postcolonial feminism but about postcolonialism itself. Postcolonialism challenges not only white feminism but white supremacy as a totality. The global structure becomes the focus of critique and thus feminists are not isolated, because gender intersects with multiple other relations within this global structure. “The advantage of postcoloniality is that it unveils a global structure that can unite struggles that are not only feminist but also racial, etc. under one umbrella thus leading to a global revolution. The global revolution should be what postcolonial scholars aim at following their ontological and epistemological frames.”* Following this, the priority should be on building transnational alliances that are postcolonial and critical in nature, rather than constantly attempting to engage white feminism.

Going back to the quote at the beginning, maybe the answer is to focus less on critiquing white feminism and more on building transnational feminism. But this is difficult to do because white feminism constitutes the ‘gaze’ that structures knowledge production and activism, since it is dominant. Maybe the solution is to not just critique white feminism but go beyond that. I read an article that gave an overview of the field of African feminist studies, and the author pointed out that the most recent scholarship no longer focuses on critiquing white feminism and instead focuses more on internal dialogue.** This means not avoiding topics like female circumcision just because white feminism might co-opt your voice, but instead having the conversation as though white feminists are not listening in. Then again, this has its own risks because putting these narratives out there can easily be used to justify wars and other interventions that have concrete material effects on women of colour, as we saw with the war in Afghanistan and instrumentalization of Afghan women’s voices by Laura Bush and co. But can voices that are critical be instrumentalized in the same way? Perhaps the solution then, is to have internal dialogues that are critical. (Of course no dialogue is ever ‘internal’ but I mean in the sense that the audience addressed is not white feminists but other postcolonial and transnational feminists.)

So I suppose the conclusion is that I don’t have any answers, other than that the focus should move away from addressing white feminists towards creating solidarity with each other and other critical thinkers. I would love to hear thoughts from other people!


* Ahmed el Hady

** Twenty-Five Years of African Women Writing African Women’s and Gendered Worlds by Nwando Achebe

Marxist feminism as a critique of intersectionality

I just finished reading a fascinating critique of intersectionality by Eve Mitchell, which can be found here. I want to first go over her main argument, and then go into her proposed solution (Marxist feminism) and why I think a more Gramscian approach would be more useful.

Mitchell’s main point in the article is that intersectionality relies on identity politics, which is a bourgeois and individualistic approach to struggle that ignores the materiality underpinning gender and gender relations.

In order to understand “identity” and “intersectionality theory,” we must have an understanding of the movement of capital (meaning the total social relations of production in this current mode of production) that led to their development in the 1960s and 1970s in the US.

Under capitalism, new gender relations developed, including:

  • The development of the wage (theorized as a tool of coercion);
  • The separation of production and reproduction (reproduction meaning more than having babies – also housework, taking care of family, etc) – reproductive labour was generally “free” while productive labour received a wage. This has been theorized as the ‘patriarchy of the wage’ since women tended to be in the reproductive sector;
  • The contradictory development of the nuclear family – on the one hand, the nuclear family was strengthened through the gendered division of labour, while on the other hand it was weakened by the separation of men from women all day long while they were at work;
  • The development of identity and alienation – “Women and people of color experience something similar in the development of capital; a shift from engaging in certain types of labor to engaging in feminized, or racially relegated forms of labor. To put it another way, under capitalism, we are forced into a box: we are a bus driver, or a hair stylist, or a woman. These different forms of labor, or different expressions of our life-activity (the way in which we interact with the world around us) limit our ability to be multi-sided human beings.”

Eve Mitchell’s critique thus revolves around this concept of identity and the alienation that accompanies it. Mitchell rightly points out that intersectionality arose in the US as a response to the gendered and racialized division of labour:

To be black meant to be objectified, relegated into one form of labor: producing and reproducing blackness. Black Power was therefore the struggle against the alienation and one-sidedness of blackness, a struggle to liberate labor, releasing its multi-sidedness, unifying labor with its conscious will.

She argues that women organized in order to break free from the alienation of ‘womanhood.’

Since women’s use of their bodies is a unique form of alienated labor for women under capitalism, it is historically the site of struggle for liberation.

This came up against the tendency in second wave feminism (and first wave I would argue) to focus on reforming capitalism as a means of emancipation: ‘equal wages for equal work.’ Both of these approaches used identity politics as a means of challenging oppressive systems. In other words, women organized on the basis of womanhood.

This continued with the theory of intersectionality. It was assumed that shared experiences formed as a bond between different kinds of women – “some individuals or groups are differentiated from other individuals or groups based on their experiences. This can be cut along many different identity lines.” Moreover, being oppressed puts you in a privileged position within the struggle – similar to the idea of standpoint theory, which argues that marginalized people have a more ‘authentic’ view on social reality, since they see both the workings of power and the effects of it (on the marginalized). This means that only the marginalized can write about their own experiences.

Mitchell’s main critique is that intersectionality is unable to overcome identity politics, and is in essence a bourgeois ideology. Mitchell agrees that it is essential to identify as a woman, or as black, or as queer – but that is not enough. 

Identity politics argues, “I am a black man,” or “I am a woman,” without filling out the other side of the contradiction “…and I am a human.”

Identity politics assumes that the basis for struggle is an equal distribution of individualism. “This is a bourgeois ideology in that it replicates the alienated individual invented and defended by bourgeois theorists and scientists (and materially enforced) since capitalism’s birth.” In other words, the increased individualism that is a result of the crisis of capitalism manifests itself in identity politics – even by those who claim to be anti-capitalist. Mitchell claims that ” theories of an “interlocking matrix of oppressions,” simply create a list of naturalized identities, abstracted from their material and historical context.”

She is not the first person to make this critique of intersectionality. Judith Butler argues that the ‘etc.’ that often follows at the end of lists of social categories signals an “embarrassed admission of exhaustion” as well as an “illimitable process of signification.” Nina Yuval-Davis disagrees with Butler, arguing that such a critique is only valid within discourse of identity politics, whereas within intersectional research it is necessary to separate the “different analytical levels in which social divisions need to be examined…the ways different social divisions are constructed by, and intermeshed in, each other in specific historical conditions.” Yuval-Davis also questions the critique that the process of breaking down is illimitable by arguing that in specific situations, certain social divisions are more important than others. Moreover, relationships between positionings are central and not reducible to the same ontological level. Yuval-Davis’ call for focusing on the historical conditions that construct social divisions is perhaps one way of combining mainstream intersectionality with Mitchell’s call for a more class-based approach. I will come back to this later.

Mitchell’s solution to the problem she outlines is a form of Marxist feminism.

To be a “woman” under capitalism means something very specific; it is even more specific for women in the US in 2013; it is even more specific for black lesbians in the US in 2013; it is even more specific for individual women. But, in a universal sense, to be a “woman” means to produce and reproduce a set of social relations through our labor, or self-activity.

In essence, Mitchell is grounding identities within the labour process and material basis of production. Her critique is thus not that intersectionality is wrong, but that it is incomplete. She points out that gender relations are real and concrete – an indirect critique of more constructivist views that have tended to dominate intersectional feminist work, especially of the postmodern and poststructural kind. There is a materiality underpinning gender and gender relations, and this materiality is often ignored by intersectional feminists. 

Moreover, the individualization of the struggle that results from an intersectional approach that relies on identity politics takes away from the universality of the class struggle: “Identity politics reproduces the appearance of an alienated individual under capitalism and so struggle takes the form of equality among groups at best, or individualized forms of struggle at worse.” Reducing the struggle to “equal rights” or “equal representation” reinforces identity as a static category. While this is an important critique, I think the difficulty results from the near impossibility of researching identities in a fluid manner – something intersectional theorists are clearly struggling with, especially within an academy in which positivism still dominates.

I would perhaps suggest that a Gramscian approach to feminism may be even more useful than the Marxist variety she proposes. Yuval-Davis’ suggestion to locate the historical conditions that construct social divisions reminded me of the Gramscian tendency to centre historical processes in any analysis. The Gramscian assumption that production creates the material basis for all forms of social existence functions as a means of centering materiality. What is unique about Gramsci, however, was his insistence on looking at both materiality and ideas – “Ideas and materialism are always bound together, mutually reinforcing one another, and not reducible to one another.” In other words, understanding gender means unpacking the ways in which gender as an ideology resulting from the material forces of production produces and is produced by gender as a set of ideas that are constructed. This, by definition, requires a historical approach. Context is important, as is clear from his emphasis on historical specificity.

A Gramscian approach would also attempt to understand how hegemony “filters through” societal structures, including the economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class and ideology. This kind of approach is already intersectional, in the sense that hegemony is an over-arching reality, based on specific material modes of production, that works through different social structures, of which gender is one. In a sense, then, Gramsci already spoke of understanding gender as more than simply womanhood or manhood, but rather as one societal structures among many.

A philosophy of praxis, common among Gramscians, also favours reflection that begins in experience – another similarity with intersectionality. Moreover, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony has long influenced feminists working on patriarchy and the ways in which consent (on the part of those marginalized by patriarchy) functions. Many feminists who have used the concept of hegemony do not see it as a form of class rule, however, which takes us back to Mitchell’s critique: the point is to locate feminist struggles within the broader class struggle. The conceptualization of hegemony could also provide a way for feminists to establish a counter-hegemony: “a popular mobilisation capable of highlighting the contradictory and exploitative nature of hegemonic ideas and arrangements, providing an alternative mode of organisation that is ethical and inclusive” (Beth Howieson).

A focus on hegemony would also address the problem of identity politics. Perhaps it was put best by Margaret Ledwith, who pointed out that mini-narratives had displaced meta-narratives, which was in one sense positive, but in another served to ‘individualize’ struggles – precisely the critique Mitchell makes. Gramsci’s view of the state as including civil and political society is also useful for feminists, as he points out that the distinction between civil and political society is artificial. This is mirrored in the feminist claim that ‘the personal is political.’ Finally, a Gramscian approach would also serve as a response to critics of Marxism who claim that Marxists ignore gender and focus excessively on class. Gramsci’s approach tends to be much less economistic than Marx’s, and his focus on both materiality and ideas is a testament to this. Moreover, even when he speaks of ‘production’ it is meant in the broadest way possible: it includes the production and reproduction of knowledge and social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of physical goods (as has been expanded on by many neo-Gramscians, including Robert Cox).

Of course, it is important to note that Gramsci himself did not focus on gender, nor do most of the scholars who use this approach. Moreover, the Eurocentrism implicit in much of his work is problematic. Nevertheless, I think a feminist approach that combines Gramscian insights with postcolonial feminist ones could be an extremely useful way forward.

In conclusion, the limits of the identity politics that are present in the intersectionality approach can be addressed by adopting a Gramscian approach to feminism that on the one hand makes materiality and capital central, while on the other hand emphasizing the production of knowledge, social relations and morals and how these intersect with social structures such as gender.